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Abstract 
Verification of large and complicated concurrent programs is an important issue in the software world. 
Stateless model checking is an appropriate method for systematically and automatically testing of large 
programs, which has proved its power in verifying code of large programs. Another well-known method 
in this area is runtime verification. Both stateless model checking and runtime verification are similar in 
some ways. One common approach in runtime verification is to construct runtime monitors for properties 
expressed in linear temporal logic. Currently, there are some semantics to check linear temporal logic 
formulae on finite paths proposed in the field of runtime verification, which can also be applied to 
stateless model checking. However, existing stateless model checkers do not support LTL formulae. In 
some settings, it is more advantageous to make use of stateless model checking instead of runtime 
verification. This paper proposes a novel encoding of one of the recent LTL semantics on finite paths into 
an actor-based system. We take a truly parallel approach without saving any program states or traces, 
which not only addresses important problems in runtime verification, but can also be applied to stateless 
model checking. 
Keywords: Runtime verification, stateless model checking, linear temporal logic (LTL), Actor model.  
1. Introduction 
In recent years, it has become more prevalent to develop concurrent programs in order to utilize 
the computational power of parallel or multi-core processors. These types of programs are very 
difficult to verify. Even by using conventional methods of testing, such as various forms of stress 
and random testing, it is still difficult to detect all concurrency errors in such programs [1]. 
Obviously, it is not possible for programmers to manually verify concurrent programs with all 
their complexities; hence, automatic verification is an essential need in the software world. 
Software developers may use different methods to ensure their programs work correctly. A 
promising method for detecting and debugging concurrency errors [1, 2] is known as Model 
checking [2, 3].  
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In order for a programmer to directly verify code of a written program, code model checking [4, 
5] is an appropriate method. From one point of view, code model checking can be classified into 
two categories: (1) stateful model checking, and (2) stateless model checking. Although stateful 
techniques are ideally suited to verify sequential programs, they usually run into the state space 
explosion problem verifying parallel programs. Owing to saving (all) the state space, the rise in 
the concurrency level may result in more complexity as well as the exponentially growth of the 
state space. In such situations, stateless model checking [1, 6] can be useful. Stateless model 
checking is especially appropriate to explore the state space of large and complicated programs 
because accurate capturing and controlling all the needed states of a large program could be a 
hard, or even impossible, task [1, 4, 7]. Global variables, heap, thread stacks, and register 
contexts are all part of the program state. Even if all the program states could be captured and 
controlled, processing such large states would be very expensive [8, 9]. 
 A stateless model checker explores the state space of a program without capturing any program 
states. The program is executed under the control of a special scheduler, which systematically 
enumerates all execution paths of the program obtained by the nondeterministic choices. In other 
words, the scheduler controls the nondeterministic execution of threads [1, 4, 10]. As this method 
is applied to the source code level, it is very similar to software testing. In fact, it is a systematic 
testing method. A stateless model checker systematically explores all possible interleavings of 
the program threads under specific input for that program. That is to say, a stateless model 
checker explores the state space of a program by concretely and continuously re-executing the 
program such that the model checker generates a different thread scheduling scenario for each 
execution [11]. Therefore, all execution paths of the program generating by nondeterministic 
choices are covered [1, 10]. Although that stateless model checkers do not suffer from state 
space explosion owing to their stateless nature, they do not support verifying LTL formulae. 
However, there are some techniques for LTL checking in runtime verification [12] that can also 
be applied to stateless model checking. 
Runtime verification is a technique in which, at run time, a monitor checks whether the execution 
of a system under inspection satisfies a given correctness temporal property [13]. Although 
runtime verification has a lot in common with stateless model checking, there is an important 
difference:  in stateless model checking, all executions of a given system are examined to answer 
whether these satisfy a given property. In contrast, runtime verification does not consider each 
possible execution of a system, but just a single or a finite subset [14]. While both of the 
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techniques are incomplete, stateless model it is not as incomplete as runtime verification. Even 
so, both of these techniques deal with finite traces and verify concrete executions of a program.  
In runtime verification, the monitor interrupts the program execution when its state with respect 
to an event of interest changes, then evaluates a set of logical properties, and finally resumes the 
program execution. The main problem here is that the monitor has to act sequentially. Another 
problem is that, usually in runtime verification, the program trace first has to be stored and then 
can be analyzed [13].  
Runtime verification of temporal logic properties requires a definition of the truth value of these 
properties on the finite paths that are observed at runtime. Although the semantics of temporal 
logic on infinite paths has been precisely defined, there is not yet an agreement on the definition 
of the semantics on finite paths [15]. Currently, there are some LTL semantics on finite paths 
[14-17], the most widely used of them for monitor construction are LTL3 [14] and FLTL [16]. 
However, in [15], Morgenstern et al. proved that even a 4-valued semantics is not sufficient to 
achieve a semantics on finite paths that converges to the semantics on infinite paths. To the best 
of our knowledge, the semantic proposed in [15] is the most complete semantic that converges to 
the infinite path semantics [15]. 
This paper proposes a novel parallel encoding of LTL semantics [15] into an actor-based system, 
which can be used for monitor construction in runtime verification improving its efficiency. In 
addition, it is suited to apply to stateless model checking. In our method, there is no need to save 
any states or traces of a running program. Instead of translating an LTL formula into a Buechi 
automaton, which is the standard approach in model checking, the formula is translated into a set 
of actors that communicate with one another as well as with the main engine that explores the 
state space (i.e. the same stateless model checker). As state space explosion is one of the main 
obstacles in practical applications of model checking, having such techniques that do not rely on 
recording of the visited states, can be a solution to this problem. We model the proposed method 
using Rebeca [18, 19], which is an actor-based modeling language with a formal foundation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the formal background 
required for this paper. Section 3 covers related work. Section 4 describes the proposed method 
for verifying LTL formulae. In this section, we model our method using Rebca modeling 
language, specify the properties of the model in LTL, and then describe the verification process 
and results.  Section 5 gives an example to illustrate the proposed method. Section 6 briefly 
discusses the implementation issues. Finally, Section 7 mentions some concluding remarks. 
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2. Preliminaries 
This section presents the formal background of this paper. The first subsection is a brief 
introduction to the semantics of LTL. The next subsection explains the semantic of a program 
state in stateless model checking. Finally, the last subsection briefly introduces the Actor model 
[20] as well as Rebeca modeling language [21] used in order to model actors’ interactions. 
2.1. Linear temporal logic (LTL) 
This subsection is a brief introduction to (propositional) linear temporal logic [22], a logical 
formalism that is appropriate for specifying linear-time (LT) properties [2]. LTL is called linear 
because the qualitative notion of time is path-based and viewed to be linear: at each moment of 
time there is only one possible successor state, and thus each time moment has a unique possible 
future. Technically speaking, this follows from the fact that the LTL formulae are path-based 
(i.e. they are interpreted in terms of sequences of states) [2]. 
In the context of stateless model checking, we have to reason with linear temporal logic on 
truncated paths. A truncated path is a path that is finite, but not necessarily maximal [17]. 
Currently, a lot of different semantics for LTL on finite traces have been proposed [14, 16, 17, 
23, 24]. As mentioned, we use  the RV
∞
-LTL semantics [15] in this paper. So, this section 
describes the semantics of RV
∞
-LTL from [15]. 
For a given set of boolean variables (propositions) AP, the set of LTL formulas is defined by the 
following grammar: ϕ := a |¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | X ϕ | [ϕ U ϕ] where a ∈ AP. Additionally, ϕ ∧ ψ, F ϕ, G 
ϕ, and 
[ϕ U ψ] are defined as abbreviations for ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ), [1 U ϕ], ¬F ¬ϕ, and [ϕ U ψ] ∨  G ϕ, 
respectively. The semantics of LTL is usually given with respect to an infinite path through a 
transition system. These infinite paths are nothing else than infinite sequences of boolean 
assignments to the variables a:  
Definition 1. (Infinite Words): Given a set of atomic propositions AP, an infinite word is a 
function  
σ : N → ℘(AP). For the sake of simplicity, σ(i) is often denoted by σ (i) for i ∈ N. Using this 
notation, words are often given in the form σ (0) σ (1) .... The suffix starting at t is written as: σ(t... ) 
:= σ (t) σ (t+1) .... For a ∈ AP, we define σ = aω as σ = a(0)a(1)a(2) .... Given an infinite word σ = 
a
(0)
a
(1)
 ..., we define σ (s...t) as the finite word u = σ (s) σ (s+1) ... σ (t). 
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The semantics of LTL is typically defined as follows [15, 22]: 
Definition 2. (Semantics of LTL on infinite paths). Given an infinite word σ, the following rules 
define the semantics of LTL: 
 [σ ⊨ω p] iff  p ∈ σ 
(0)
 for p ∈ AP 
 [σ ⊨ω ¬ϕ] iff [σ ⊭ω ϕ] 
 [σ ⊨ω ϕ ∧ ψ] iff [σ ⊨ω ϕ] and [σ ⊨ω ψ] 
 [σ ⊨ω ϕ ∨ ψ] iff [σ ⊨ω ϕ] or [σ ⊨ω ψ] 
 [σ ⊨ω X ϕ] iff [σ
(1... )
 ⊨ω ϕ] 
 [σ ⊨ω [ϕ U ψ]] iff there is a δ such that [σ
(δ... )
 ⊨ω ψ] and for all t with t < δ, we have [σ 
(t... )
 
⊨ω ϕ] 
In [15], a hierarchy of temporal formulae has been defined by the grammar rules of Table 1. 
Table 1. Classes of the Temporal Logic Hierarchy [15] 
PG ::= p | ¬PF | PG ∧ PG | PG ∨ PG 
| X PG | [PG U PG] 
PF ::= p | ¬PG | PF ∧ PF | PF ∨ PF 
| X PF | [PF U PF] 
PPrefix ::= PG | PF | ¬PPrefix | PPrefix ∧ PPrefix | PPrefix ∨ PPrefix 
PGF ::= PPrefix 
| ¬PFG | PGF ∧ PGF | PGF ∨ PGF 
| X PGF | [PGF U PGF] | [PGF U PF] 
PFG ::= PPrefix 
| ¬PGF | PFG ∧ PFG | PFG ∨ PFG 
| X PFG | [PFG U PFG] | [PG U PFG] 
PStreett ::= PGF | PFG | ¬PStreett | PStreett ∧ PStreett | PStreett ∨ PStreett 
Definition 3. (Temporal Logic Classes): the logics TLκ for κ ∈ {G, F, Prefix, FG, GF, Streett} is 
defined by the grammar rules given in Table 1, where TLκ is the set of formulas that can be 
derived from the non-terminal Pκ (p represents any variable p ∈ AP). 
TLG is the set of formulae where each occurrence of a weak/strong until operator is 
positive/negative, and similarly, each occurrence of a weak/strong until operator in TLF is 
negative/positive. Hence, both logics are dual to each other, which means that one contains the 
negations of the other one. TLPrefix is the boolean closure of TLG and TLF. The logics TLGF and 
TLFG are constructed in the same way as TLG and TLF; however, there are two differences: (1) 
these logics allow occurrences of TLPrefix where otherwise variables would have been required in 
TLG and TLF, and (2) there are additional ‘asymmetric’ grammar rules. It can be easily proved 
that TLGF and TLFG are also dual to each other, and their intersection strictly contains TLPrefix. 
6 
Finally, TLStreett is the Boolean closure of TLGF and TLFG. While there are syntactic restrictions on 
TLStreett, i.e. not every LTL formula is a TLStreett formula, TLStreett contains for each LTL formula 
an equivalent formula, and nearly all formulas used in practice belong to TLStreett. Moreover, for 
those formulas not in TLStreett, it is typically not difficult to find an equivalent one in TLStreett [15]. 
2.1.1.  Asymptotic Finite Linear Temporal Logic (RV∞–LTL)  
Table 1 divides LTL formulae into different logics based on their grammar rules. The formulae 
whose specifications are based on the grammar TLκ fall into this type of logic. Practically 
speaking, we should always use the smallest logic, because of the quality of the results. How big 
a logic is, is determinable by Table 1: TLG and TLF are the smallest, then TLPrefix, and so on. In 
order to verify a finite path,  Morgenstern et al. [15] defined LTL semantics per each logic. 
Therefore, when it comes to the verification of a particular LTL formula, first it should be found 
out which category the formula belongs to. Then, the formula should be verified using the 
semantic of that category. [15] 
Definition 4. (Semantics of Linear Temporal Logic RV
∞–TLG) [15]: Let u = u
(0)
u
(1) 
...u
(n) ∈ Σ∗ 
denote a finite path of length n + 1. The truth value of a TLG formula ϕ wrt. u, denoted with [u ⊨G 
ϕ], is an element of B3 = {1, 0, ⊤G} and is inductively defined as follows: 
- [ε ⊨G ϕ] = ⊤G 
- [u ⊨G a] = {1              𝑖𝑓 𝑎 ∈  𝑢
(0)
0              𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒              
         , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑎 ∈  𝐴𝑃 
 
- [u ⊨G  ϕ ∧ ψ] = {
1                       𝑖𝑓 ∀𝑤 ∈  𝛴𝜔 ∶  𝑢𝑤 ⊨𝜔  𝜙 ∧ 𝜓                                 
⊤𝐺                      𝑖𝑓 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  𝜙]  = ⊤𝐺  𝑎𝑛𝑑 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  𝜓]  =  ⊤𝐺                 
0                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                                       
 
 
- [u ⊨G  ϕ ∨ ψ] = {
1                          𝑖𝑓 ∀𝑤 ∈  𝛴𝜔 ∶  𝑢𝑤 ⊨𝜔  𝜙 ∨ 𝜓                  
⊤𝐺                       𝑖𝑓 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  𝜙] =  ⊤𝐺  𝑜𝑟 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  𝜓]  =  ⊤𝐺
0                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                                       
 
- [u ⊨G X ϕ] = [u(1...n) ⊨G  ϕ] 
 
- [u ⊨G [ϕ U ψ]] = [u ⊨G (ψ ∨ (ϕ ∧ X [ϕ U ψ]))] 
 
Definition 5. (Semantics of Linear Temporal Logic RV
∞–TLF) [15]: Given a finite prefix u = 
u
(0)
u
(1)
 ...u
(n)
 of an infinite word u∞, the semantics of  RV
∞–TLF is defined by  
 [u ⊨F ϕ] = {
1          𝑖𝑓 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  ¬𝜙] =  0     
⊥𝐹        𝑖𝑓 [𝑢 ⊨𝐺  ¬𝜙] =  ⊤𝐺   
0          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                     
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In [15], LTL semantics for all classes shown in Table 1 have been defined. In this paper, for the 
sake of brevity, we only propose our method for the classes TLG and TLF. However, the method 
can be extended to cover all other semantics. It should be pointed out that the semantic of FLTL 
[16] and RV
∞–TLG are evaluated in the same manner [15]. Therefore, our proposed method can 
be applied for monitor construction based on FLTL semantic as well. For a complete discussion 
on RV
∞–LTL, please see [15]. 
2.2. Program states 
In a multi-threaded program containing a finite set of threads and a set of shared objects, threads 
communicate with each other only through shared objects. Operations on shared objects are 
called visible operations, while the rest are invisible operations. A state of a multi-threaded 
program contains the global state of all shared objects and the local state of each thread. In a 
multi-threaded program, a visible operation performed by a thread is considered as a transition 
that advances the program from one global state to a subsequent global state. Such a transition is 
followed by a finite sequence of invisible operations of the same thread, ending just before the 
next visible operation of that thread [25, 26]. 
To avoid exploring redundant interleavings, stateless model checkers should use dynamic partial 
order reduction (DPOR) [26] because the number of possible interleavings grows exponentially 
as the program is getting large. Partial order reduction algorithms only explore a proper subset of 
the enabled transitions at a given state s such that it is guaranteed to preserve the interested 
properties. DPOR dynamically tracks threads interactions to identify points where alternative 
paths in the state space need to be explored [11, 26].  
To perform DPOR, a stateless model checker explores the program state space by concretely 
executing the program and observing its visible operations. It considers consecutive invisible 
operations with only one visible operation as a single operation [10, 27]. In this paper, we use the 
notion of code partitioning. Stateless model checkers are expected to apply some mechanisms for 
detecting global transitions. Therefore, we refer such mechanisms to partitioning, whereby code 
is divided into several global locations. In fact, the model checker interleaves threads according 
to these locations.   
Each partition of the code (each location) starts with a visible operation, and ends just before the 
next visible operation. When a thread is scheduled, if it can progress, it continues executing until 
the end of its current location. After reaching the end of a location, it yields the processor to the 
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model checker. If the thread holding the processor cannot progress, the scheduler should choose 
another thread. It goes without saying that this event may occur at the beginning of a location 
because only the first command of each location can be a waiting function call (a visible 
operation). Therefore, when it comes to LTL checking, we use the described definition for a 
state. 
2.3. Actor model 
Actor is a model for concurrent computing to develop parallel and distributed systems. Each 
actor is an autonomous entity that acts asynchronously and concurrently with other actors. It can 
send/receive messages to/from other actors, create new actors, and update its own local state. An 
actor system is composed of a collection of actors, some of whom may send messages to (or 
receive messages from) actors outside the system [28]. An actor using a command like send(a, v) 
creates a new message with receiver a and contents v, and then puts it to the message delivery 
system. This system guarantees the received message will be finally delivered to actor a. It can 
create another actor with a command like newadr(). Suchlike commands create a new actor and 
return its address. Each actor may have its own behaviors to process received messages. In other 
words, an actor’s behavior embodies the code that should be executed by the actor after receiving 
a message [29]. 
As we stated, this paper uses the Actor model to propose its new verification method, which is 
also implemented by using an actor language. An actor language is an extension of a functional 
language. Erlang [30, 31] is arguably the best known implementation of the Actor model [28]. 
We are implementing the method proposed in this paper by using Erlang. In such languages, 
functions are used to define actors’ behaviors. That is, each actor has a behavioral functional that 
embodies the actor behaviors after receiving particular messages. 
In this paper, we model our method using Rebeca (Reactive Object Language)  [18, 19], which is 
an actor-based modeling language with a formal foundation [18]. Then, we use the model 
checking technique to verify our models. For this purpose, model checker RMC [32] is used, which 
is a tool for direct model checking of Rebeca models, without using back-end model checkers. 
Using RMC, properties should be specified based on state variables of rebecs. 
Rebeca is a Java-like language, which is mainly a modeling language with formal verification 
support and a background theory [21]. A Rebeca model consists of concurrently executing 
reactive objects called rebecs. In fact, rebecs are actors that communicate with each another by 
9 
asynchronous message passing. Each message is put in the unbounded queue of the receiver 
rebec, specifying a unique method to be invoked when the message is serviced [19]. 
Figure 1 illustrates the definition of a simple Rebeca class. Although in a pure actor model the 
queue length is unbounded, the modeler has to declare the maximum queue size in the class 
definition owing to model checking. This size is indicated in parenthesis next to the reactiveclass 
name. A class definition uses two central declarations knownrebecs and statevars. The 
knownrebecs entry shows the actors this rebec can communicate with. The rebecs included in the 
knownrebecs part of a reactive class definition are those rebecs whose message servers may be 
called by instances of this reactive class. The statevars defines variables used for holding the 
rebec state [33]. 
After these declarations, the methods that handle messages are defined like Java code. These 
methods are called the message servers of the reactiveclass because their task is to serve 
incoming messages. Each reactive class definition has a message server named initial. In the 
initial state, each rebec has an initial message in its message queue, thus the first method 
executed by each rebec is the initial message server. 
A message server contains one or more Rebeca statements. The logical and arithmetic 
expressions in Rebeca are similar to Java. However, not all of the Java expressions are valid in 
Rebeca, and only a set of essential set of operators are included [33]. For more information about 
Rebeca, please see [18, 33]. 
reactiveclass Rebec1(5) { 
       knownrebecs { Rebec2 actor2 ; } 
       statevars {  } 
       msgsrv initial ( ) {    self.msg1 ( );    } 
       msgsrv serv_msg1( ) { 
       /* Send a message to actor2, which should be processed by  
         method process_msg in reactiveclass Rebec2. This message 
         contains an integer value like “7”  
      */ 
                   actor2.process_msg (7);   
       } 
       msgsrv serv_msg2 ( ) {        /* Handling message 2 */        } 
} 
Figure 1  A typical class definition in Rebeca  [33]  
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The execution of rebecs in a Rebeca program takes place in a coarse grained interleaving 
scheme. In this manner, each rebec takes a message from the top of its queue and executes its 
corresponding message server. During execution, other rebecs are not allowed to be executed; 
i.e. the execution of a message server is atomic [33, 34].    
3. Related work 
As far as we know, prior to DSCMC [27, 35], there have been three stateless model checkers, 
namely Inspect [10, 36], CHESS [37, 38], and VeriSoft [4, 39]. Unfortunately, none of the 
foregoing tools support LTL formulae because, when it comes to the model checking field, LTL 
formulae reason about infinite traces. Stateless model checkers have no direct capability of 
reasoning about infinite traces. Stateless model checking is fairly a new trend in comparison with 
the stateful field. There is a lot of interesting work to do on this area. So, Extending stateless 
model checkers to check arbitrary LTL formulae is an interesting research direction.   
LTL checking algorithms usually follow an automata-based approach taken from [40]. In this 
approach, the negation of the LTL formula is translated into a Buchi automaton [2, 41], 
synchronized with the transition system of the program state space, and then the verification 
problem is reduced to a simple graph problem [41]. Handling of large state spaces is so difficult 
(or even impractical) that the state space explosion has always been a pressing and serious 
problem in the stateful model checking field.  
In order to verify LTL formulae, stateful model checkers have to capture the state space of the 
program, and the number of states grows exponentially in the number of variables in the program 
graph: for N variables with a domain of k possible values, the number of states grows up to k
N
. 
Even if a program only contains a few variables, the state space that must be analyzed may be 
very large. This exponential growth in the number of parallel components and the number of 
variables leads to the enormous size of the state space of practically relevant systems. The reality 
is that verification problem in stateful model checking is particularly space-critical [2]. 
Nevertheless, many researches have been undertaken into this field leading the way to great 
achievements including some recent work in [42-45]. 
Of all the research in this area, the work by Ganai et al. [45] is more relevant to stateless model 
checking. Coping with state space explosion, they combined state-based and path-based (like 
stateless method) model checking, and then used a divide and conquer technique to explore state 
space. The main focus of their work is on proposing a new state exploration technique by 
combining state-based and path-based methods together. In other words, they also used the 
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conventional techniques for verifying LTL formulae and did not propose a new LTL verification 
method (the focus of this paper). 
Another work in this area was carried out by Evangelista and Kristensen [42]. They proposed an 
algorithm that is a combination of the common on-the-fly LTL model checking algorithms with 
sweep-line method [46]. Conventional on-the-fly LTL model checking is based on the 
exploration of a product Buchi automaton; i.e. the negation of the LTL formula to be checked is 
represented as a Buchi automaton, and then the product of this property automaton and the state 
space, viewed as a Buchi automaton, are explored using a nested depth-first traversal [41] in 
search for a cycle containing an acceptance state (an acceptance cycle). This work also has 
nothing to do with stateless model checking and is appropriate to the stateful techniques. 
De Wulf et al. [43] proposed algorithms for LTL satisfiability and model-checking. In their 
algorithms nondeterministic automata were not constructed from LTL formulae. They directly 
alternated automata using efficient exploration techniques based on anti-chains. Similar to the 
previous work, their method is also not suitable for stateless model checking.  
In the literature, the concept of runtime verification really stands out, which checks whether a 
system execution satisfies or violates a given correctness property [47]. A procedure that on-the-
fly verifies conformance of the system’s behavior to the specified property is called a monitor. 
The main idea of runtime verification is to monitor and analyze software and hardware system 
executions. Although this idea is fairly analogous to the idea of stateless model checking, 
methods used for runtime verification are completely different. In runtime verification, 
monitoring is carried out as follows. Two “black boxes”, the system and its reference model, are 
executed in parallel and stimulated with the same input sequences; the monitor dynamically 
captures their output traces and tries to match them. The main problem is that a model is usually 
more abstract than the real system, both in terms of functionality and timing. For this reason, 
trace-to-trace matching is difficult, which causes the system to generate events in different order 
or even miss some of them [47]. 
Nowadays, there are a variety of formalisms to specify properties on observed behavior of 
computer systems including variants of temporal logic such as LTL3 and TLTL [14]. In addition, 
currently, a lot of methods have been proposed to construct monitors [14, 15, 47]. As both 
stateless model checking and runtime verification deal with finite paths, current semantics of 
temporal logic on finite paths can be applied to the stateless model checking field.  
The main problem in runtime verification is the extra overhead imposed by the monitor. Having 
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an efficient monitor plays an important part in reducing the cost of verification. Several 
techniques have been proposed in this regard, such as improved instrumentation (e.g., using 
aspect-oriented programming [48]), combining static and dynamic analysis techniques [49, 50], 
efficient monitor generation and management[51], and schedulable monitoring [52]. Each of the 
forgoing approaches remedies the overhead issue to some extent and in specific contexts. 
However, there has been little work on reducing and containing the overhead of runtime 
verification through isolating the monitor in a different processing unit. With this motivation in 
mind, Berkovich et al. [13] proposed a technique that permits the separation of the functional 
from monitoring concerns into different computing units. Their formal language for monitoring 
properties is LTL3. In their method, a host process receives the program trace in the shared 
memory and distributes chunks of this trace among a set of monitoring worker threads running 
on the GPU. The worker threads are capable of monitoring one or more properties 
simultaneously. 
Our method can also isolate the monitoring unit in a different computing unit. In [13], the 
program trace has to be saved first, and then it is distributed to different processing units for 
analysis. However, in our method, there is no need to save any program traces or states at all. 
The problem with saving the program trace is that the causal order of occurrence of events in the 
program trace has to be respected while evaluating a property in a parallel fashion. For this 
reason, authors in [13] had to formalize a notion of LTL3 property history to encode the causal 
order of events for parallelization. Therefore, their approach demands more time and memory in 
comparison with our proposed method. 
To sum up, as far as we know, any LTL verification method in the stateless model checking field 
has not been proposed yet; this paper presents a new LTL checking method for this field, which 
can also be considered as a method for constructing a parallel and distributed monitor in runtime 
verification. 
4.  An Actor formalism for LTL 
This section describes a novel method for stateless model checking of LTL formulae. In this 
method, LTL formulae are dynamically checked during program execution without storing any 
program states. For this reason, it is possible to verify any number of LTL properties away with 
affecting on the size of the program state space and state space explosion. The method to verify 
LTL formulae, proposed in this section, is quite different from conventional LTL checking 
algorithms. 
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In our method, we suppose that there is a stateless model checker that runs the program under 
test and systematically explores its state space. This model checker should accept all possible 
interleavings under strong fairness [1, 2, 27]. To generate different possible interleavings, the 
program must be repeatedly run under the stateless model checker until all possible thread 
scheduling options are generated. This paper concentrates on how LTL properties can be verified 
using such model checkers. Our method is proposed as a unit of LTL checking, which should 
cooperate with the stateless model checker. This unit is an actor system, a collection of actors 
with a hierarchical structure.  
It should be pointed out that the process of stateless model checking is composed of finite 
iterations. Each iteration is equivalent to the execution of program P under the control of the 
model checker scheduler. Program P satisfies LTL property ϕ if ϕ is held by all iterations of 
stateless model checking. Intuitively, if an LTL property is violated in one program execution, it 
means that the property has been violated in one path of the program state space; consequently, 
the program does not satisfy this property. In the same way, if an LTL property is held by all 
iterations of stateless model checking then the property is satisfied by all paths in its state space; 
consequently, the program satisfies the property.  
We use this idea as a basis for LTL checking in stateless model checking. It shows the feasibility 
of applying LTL checking to this field. But, the major need in this regard is to have an LTL 
checking method that can work with the stateless nature of the model checker. The remainder of 
this section proposes such method to solve this problem.  
In light of the grammar of LTL formulae, terminals in this grammar are atomic propositions (i.e. 
a ∈ AP) [2]. An atomic proposition is a simple condition defined on program variables (e.g. a > 
0, b = 0, c != d, etc.). Therefore, every LTL formula ends in simple conditions. The result of a 
simple condition is always either true or false. We use this fact for designing the unit of LTL 
checking.  
Now, let us introduce the idea of the method with a simple example. Suppose you specify an 
LTL property as “(¬ ((a > 0) ˄ (b = 1))) U (c = 0))” where a, b, and c are integer variables in 
the program. The parse tree for this property is shown in Figure 2. All LTL properties, like this 
property, are evaluated from leaves towards the root of the parse tree; i.e. in this example, first, 
operator and (˄) should be evaluated, next, the not operator (¬), and then operator until (U) can 
be evaluated. We exploit this fact in our method; as it can be seen, leaves of a parse tree are 
simple conditions (or APs) while both of its root and intermediate nodes are LTL operators.  
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Figure 2  The parse tree of (¬ ((a > 0) ˄ (b = 1))) U (c = 0)) 
To check an LTL formula by our method, first a property is parsed, next an actor whose behavior 
corresponds to the root operator is created, and then existing sub-trees of the root are sent to the 
behavioral function of this actor as its arguments; e.g. in the above example, an actor who 
behaves corresponding to operator U is created and two sub-trees are sent to its behavioral 
function as its input arguments. Thereafter, this actor also makes the parse tree for each input 
argument (i.e. each sub-tree). In the same way, an actor for the root operator of each sub-tree is 
created and related sub-trees are sent to them. This process is continued by new actors until 
reaching the leaves; e.g., in this example, the actor with until behavior creates another actor with 
not behavior, and then the created actor creates a new actor with and behavior. When this new 
actor reaches a leaf (i.e. a simple condition) after parsing one of its arguments, it should create a 
new actor that checks a simple condition (we call such actors condition checkers). The 
intermediate nodes of the primary parse tree are called workers that are actors that behave 
corresponding to LTL operators. This hierarchical structure described here is shown in Figure 3 
(a). There are two other kinds of actor in this hierarchy, property checker and master, which are 
described below. 
In this paper, we suppose the existence of a mechanism in the model checker so that condition 
checkers are be able to monitor the state of the intended APs. At the implementation level, the 
model checker can think of different mechanisms. For example, based on the property the user 
has defined, it can instrument the program code such that at every point in the code that the 
variables in the APs of the property are defined
†
, a piece of code is added to the original code, by 
which the simple conditions in the property (i.e. APs) can be monitored during stateless model 
checking. By doing so, condition checkers are informed about the status of their desired APs at 
the end of each state.
‡
 A similar mechanism has been implemented in DSCMC [27]. 
 
                                                     
† The variable definition means that a new value is assigned to the variable (e.g. using of the assignment operator “=”).  
‡  The definition of a state in the context of stateless model checking is given in Section 2.1.3. 
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Figure 3  The hierarchical structure of the Unit of LTL checking. (a) Existing actors and their roles. (b) Usage of 
the hierarchical structure of the actor system for modeling.
The unit of LTL checking (Figure 3 (a)) has a major actor as the master actor, whose task is to 
load the user-defined LTL properties at the beginning of stateless model checking, and then 
create a property checker actor for each property. The property checker actors use a function for 
parsing a given property. This function creates the parse tree of its input argument, and then 
returns the root of this tree and sub-trees of the root. Thereafter, the property checker creates a 
worker that will be in charge of the sub-tree. The return sub-tree is also sent as an input argument 
to the behavioral functions of this worker. 
As mentioned, the created worker by property checker also parses its input arguments (i.e. sub-
tree(s) sent by property checker). Then, with respect to the parse tree of its arguments, it also 
creates other worker actor(s). Needless to say, workers are different in their behavior. 
Permissible behaviors for workers exactly correspond to LTL operators. For example, and 
worker, not worker, and until worker have the same semantics of operators ˄, ¬, and U, 
respectively. You can see the procedure for creating the described hierarchy in Figure 4. 
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1. master (Properties) { 
 Load Properties; 
 For each Property in the Properties list 
       Create a property checker actor; 
       Assign each property checker a Property; 
    } 
2. property checker (Property) { 
 Parse Property; 
 For the root operator 
    Create a worker actor with behavior of the root; 
     Assign the subtree of the root to the worker; 
   } 
3. worker (Args) { 
           Parse each available subtree in Args; 
           For each available root operator in subtrees of Args 
                Create a worker actor with behavior of the root; 
                Assign the subtree of the root to the worker; 
 
    
          If there is no LTL operator in the root 
              Create a condition checker; 
              Assign the related AP to the condition checker; 
   } 
Figure 4 Procedure for creating the verification hierarchy 
 
In our method, each property checker actor parses an LTL property, and then creates a worker 
actor to evaluate the operator in the root of the parse tree. Consequently, the created worker also 
repeats this process until a worker actor reaches the simple condition(s). In other words, tasks are 
downwardly dispatched, then, results are upwardly collected from workers to their supervisors, 
and finally the results of evaluating get to property checkers, which are at the top level of the 
verification hierarchy (of course, after the master). 
4.1. Modeling the stateless model checking of LTL operators in Rebeca 
This section models the actor system described in the previous subsection. In this regard, we use 
Rebeca modeling language [18, 19].  
We need an abstract model that correctly embodies the possible interactions between actors. For 
this purpose, we exploit the hierarchical structure shown in Figure 3. In this structure, the 
position of an intermediate node (worker) is similar to Figure 3 (b). As described earlier, workers 
correspond to LTL operators. The behavior of each worker actor is modeled in Rebeca using the 
structure shown in Figure 3. That is, each worker has a supervisor and at least one child. In other 
words, each worker is an LTL operator that can have at most two children. Each child may also 
be an LTL operator. Besides, condition checkers are also children of their immediate parent 
(worker). Each worker has one supervisor (its immediate parent), which may be an LTL operator 
or a property checker. As it can be seen, a child only sends its evaluation result (true or false) to 
its supervisor, regardless of whether it is a condition checker or an LTL operator. A supervisor 
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also can receive either true or false from the worker regardless of the fact that the worker is 
which LTL operator. 
On account of the above structure, it does not matter to a worker who its children and its 
supervisor are. Every worker only receives true or false from its children, and only sends true or 
false to its supervisor. Therefore, we can model the LTL checking unit, and verify the behavior 
of each actor (i.e. behavioral functions) independently. In this model, the behavior of each 
worker is characterized in Rebeca, and then other actors the worker can communicate with are 
modeled as black boxes that correspond to the same worker’s supervisor and children. That is, 
black boxes used in the model, namely Child, and Parent, are actors that behave like a child and 
a supervisor, respectively (see Figure 3). A child is expected to send only either true or false to 
the worker, and a supervisor also expects to receive the result of the verification from the worker. 
Even so, in practice, when there are some until operators in a property, some actors may be 
waiting for receiving results from their children. In other words, it is possible for an intermediate 
actor not to hear from its children in a particular state. We have to model this fact, hence, in our 
models, workers/ supervisors/ children send three types of message: (1) a message that models 
true, (2) a message that models false, and (3) a message that models a waiting state. 
Before moving on to modeling, we should point out the role of actors master, property checker, 
and condition checker. These actors are important when it comes to the implementation of the 
model. In terms of modeling, it makes no difference to the result of verification who creates 
property checkers and workers, or how the model checker informs condition checkers about the 
APs status. The main focus of the model should be maintained on how a worker behaves as a 
particular LTL operator, and how it evaluates its operands. For this reason, we model a worker 
regardless of who its parent and child (children) are. For instance, as for the Until operator, the 
model should demonstrate the way by which this actor evaluates results of its operand; e.g. how 
to act when it receives a true message from its left operand, how to act when it never receives a 
true from its right operand, and so on.  
We model the behavior of the workers that correspond to and (˄), not (¬), and Until (U) 
operators. Other LTL operators can be derived from these operators. Each of the forgoing 
operators is independently modeled; i.e. the children (or supervisor) of each operator are viewed 
as a black boxes that only send (or receive) true and false.  
Figure 5 models three rebecs that correspond to (a) stateless model checker, (b) child, and (c) 
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supervisor. The rebec who models stateless model checker, SMC, initiates the execution of the 
model from the method sendAP on line 6 of Figure 5 (a). This rebec models the fact that at the 
end of each state, the stateless model checker sends the status of the desired APs to the condition 
checkers. After that, condition checkers send the results to their supervisors, and next their 
supervisors, according to their own functionality, evaluate the results and send them to their own 
supervisors. In practice, this process should continue until the most upper worker evaluates the 
results and sends the result of its evaluation to its own property checker. The property checker 
has to come a decision about the verification result at the end of each iteration.  As you can see, 
the end of each iteration has been modeled at line 9 of Figure 5 (a). 
In the models, we suppose that Child (Figure 5 (b)) is an intermediate worker that its immediate 
supervisor is one of the LTL operators and, not, or until. Practically, such an actor receives the 
results of verification from its children, but here, rebec Child itself randomly generates this 
results at line 12, Figure 5 (c). Here, the Child randomly generates three results, which is the 
same three types for a result message described above: true (modeled with 1), false (modeled 
with 0), and a waiting state (modeled with 2). When modeling a waiting state, message 
operator.from_leftChild (false, false) is used (like line 15 of Figure 5 (c)). The second argument 
in this message models a waiting state; when this argument is false, it shows a waiting state. In 
this case, the value of the first argument does not matter. But, if the second argument is true, it 
shows that the Child is sending a result to its supervisor (true or false), which is sent via the first 
argument in the message (see lines 16-27 of Figure 5 (c)).  
There are two rebecs of Child in our model: leftWorker and rightWorker. For a binary operator, 
the worker corresponding to that operator receives two results: one is sent by rightWorker and 
the other is sent by leftWorker. As for the unary operator not, only messages from leftWorker are 
processed.  
In the models, rebec Supervisor (Figure 5 (b)) models the immediate supervisor of the worker 
whose behavior is supposed to be modeled (i.e. one of the workers that acts as one of the LTL 
operators not, and, until). Supervisor using message server result_fromOp receives the result of 
verification from such a worker (line 5, Figure 5 (b)). As you can see, this method also has two 
arguments whose second one models a waiting state. 
In Rebeca, verification is performed based on state variables of rebecs so for the rebecs in Figure 
5., two variables used to specify properties of our models are state variables result and 
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resultReceived in rebec Supervisor (lines 4-5 , Figure 5 (b)). The received result from the LTL 
operator (worker) is saved in variable result. We need variable resultReceived while modeling 
because Rebeca initializes state variables at the beginning of execution so the variable result has 
a value even before receiving the real result from the worker. Therefore, when resultReceived 
turns into true, it denotes that the Supervisor has just received the result from the worker (at line 
8 Figure 5 (b)). If the supervisor runs into a waiting state, the resultReceived will remain false. 
4.1.1. Modeling the LTL operator Until 
Figure 6 shows the rebec for the actor that behaves corresponding to LTL operator until. As our 
method uses the Actor model, it is nondeterministic that which actor first processes its incoming 
messages. Therefore, in the model, you may see some code or state variables for required 
synchronization. 
 
Figure 5 Rebeca model for the stateless model checker, children and supervisors. (a)  The rebec for Stateless model 
checker. (b) The rebec for Supervisor. (c) The rebec for Child. 
1. reactiveclass Child (100) {  
2.        knownrebecs  {  Until operator;  }      
3.        statevars  {  
4.                byte result;       boolean isLeft;     boolean isRight; 
5.         }  
6.        msgsrv initial (boolean position) { 
7.               result = 2;  
8.               if (position) { isRight = true;     isLeft = false;  } 
9.               else {   isRight = false;     isLeft = true;  } 
10.      } 
11.      msgsrv send_result (  ) {  
12.            result = ?(0,1,2); 
13.            if (isLeft) {  
14.                     if (result == 2)   
15.                              operator.from_leftChild(false, false); 
 
     (c) 
 
16.                    else if (result == 1) 
17.                             operator.from_leftChild(true, true); 
18.                    else  
19.                             operator.from_leftChild(false, true); 
20.            } 
21.            else  { 
22.                    if (result == 2)  
23.                             operator.from_rightChild (false, false); 
24.           else if (result == 1) 
25.                             operator.from_rightChild (true, true) 
26.      else  operator.from_rightChild(false, true); 
27.            } 
28.      } 
29. } 
1. reactiveclass SMC (100) {  
2.        knownrebecs {  
3.             Child leftWorker; Child rightWorker;  Until operator;} 
4.        statevars {  boolean end_of_prog; } 
5.        msgsrv initial (  ) { end_of_prog = false; self.sendAP ( );  } 
6.        msgsrv sendAP (  ) { 
7.   leftWorker.send_result (  ); 
8.  rightWorker.send_result (  ); 
9.  end_of_prog = ?(true, false); 
10.                if (end_of_prog)  operator.endprog  ( );    
11.      } 
12. } 
(a) 
1. reactiveclass Supervisor (100) {  
2.        knownrebecs    {    }      
3.        statevars  { boolean result;    boolean resultReceived;    }  
4.        msgsrv initial (  ) { result = false;  resultReceived = false; }  
5.        msgsrv result_fromOp (boolean res, boolean st)  {  
6. if (st) { 
7.   result = res; 
8.  resultReceived = true; 
9.  } 
10. self.reset ( ); 
11.       } 
12.       msgsrv reset ( ) {  resultReceived = false; } 
13. } 
(b) 
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For example, when leftWorker and rightWorker send their own results to rebec Until, it is 
unpredictable that which actor first sends its message. However, we know that both of them send 
messages about the same state. Therefore, rebec Until first requires to receive both of these 
messages, and then evaluates them. This situation is modeled using state variables rFlag and 
lFlag as well as message servers from_leftChild and from_rightChild. 
When both of variables lFlag and rFlag become true, it means that rebec Until has received the 
result from both of its children then it comes to processing. Therefore, method until_bhv at line 
13 of Figure 6 is executed. In this method, the rebec uses variables leftOp and rightOp. Variable 
leftOp contains the value of the last message sent by leftWorker. In the same way, rightOp 
contains the value of the last message sent by rightWorker.  
 
 
Figure 6 Rebeca model for Until worker  
In order to verify the model, we use two state variables updatedLeftOp and updatedRightOp, 
which contain the results respectively sent by leftWorker and rightWorker after synchronization. 
This is because the initial state that should be considered to verify the model is not the same 
1. reactiveclass Until(100) {  
2.       knownrebecs { Supervisor parent;  SMC mc; }      
3.      statevars {  
4.            boolean leftOp;    boolean rightOp;   boolean rFlag;  
5.            boolean lFlag;       boolean r_st;      boolean l_st; 
6.            boolean updatedRightOp;  boolean updatedLeftOp; 
7.      }  
8.      msgsrv initial ( ) { 
9.            leftOp = false;    rightOp = false;       rFlag = false; 
10.          lFlag = false;      r_st = false;      l_st = false; 
11.          updatedLeftOp = true;       updatedRightOp = false; 
12.     }  
13.     msgsrv until_bhv ( ) {  
14.          if (l_st && r_st) { 
15.                    if (rightOp)         parent.result_fromOp (true, true); 
16.           else if (! leftOp)  parent.result_fromOp (false, true);  
17.                   else if (leftOp && (!rightOp))   
18.                              parent.result_fromOp (false, false);  
19.          } 
20.          else if (r_st) { 
21.                   if (rightOp)        parent.result_fromOp (true, true);  
22.                   else                      parent.result_fromOp (false, false); 
23.           } 
24.           else if (l_st) { 
25.                   if (! leftOp)         parent.result_fromOp (false, true); 
26.                   else                       parent.result_fromOp (false, false); 
27.           } 
28.           else      parent.result_fromOp (false, false); 
29.           mc.sendAP( ); 
30.     } 
   
31.     msgsrv from_leftChild (boolean res, boolean st) { 
32.          lFlag = true;      l_st = st; 
33.          if (st)     leftOp = res; 
34.          if (lFlag && rFlag) { 
35.                    lFlag = false;       rFlag = false; 
36.                    updatedRightOp = rightOp;  
37.                    updatedLeftOp = leftOp; 
38.                    self.until_bhv( ); 
39.          } 
40.     } 
41.     msgsrv from_rightChild (boolean res, boolean st) { 
42.          rFlag = true;     r_st = st; 
43.          if (st)      rightOp = res; 
44.          if (lFlag && rFlag) { 
45.                    lFlag = false;         rFlag = false; 
46.                    updatedRightOp = rightOp;  
47.                    updatedLeftOp = leftOp; 
48.                    self.until_bhv( ); 
49.          } 
50.     } 
51.     msgsrv endprog ( ) { 
52.          parent.result_fromOp (true, true); 
53.          self.endV ( ); 
54.     } 
55.     msgsrv endV ( ) {    self.endV ();    } 
56. } 
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initial state in the model. In light of the fact that Rebeca itself initializes state variables, leftOp 
and rightOp contains initial values before receiving any messages from leftWorker and 
rightWorker. This situation brings about some problem while specifying properties of the model 
because the until operator is sensitive to the initial state of its operands. To resolve this issue, we 
use auxiliary variables updatedLeftOp and updatedRightOp for specifying properties. 
As mentioned, it is possible for the until worker to receive nothing from one or two of its 
children in practice (i.e. a waiting state). Therefore, it is also possible for the until rebec to 
receive a message that shows a waiting state. Boolean variables l_st and r_st  model this 
situation. Variable l_st holds the second argument of method from_leftChild. As mentioned 
above, if this argument is false, it shows a waiting state. In the same way, variable r_st keeps the 
second argument of method from_rightChild. This fact is also true of other workers (Not and 
And). 
Method until_bhv models the until operator in the RV
∞–TLG semantic, where an operator 
evaluates ⊤G  when there is no next state. For this reason, when an iteration of stateless model 
checking comes to an end, all workers will receive the endprog ( ) message (like line 51 of 
Figure 6). As this message shows that there will be no next state in the program execution, 
workers send true to its supervisor. As for until, the rebec sends message result_fromOp (true, 
true) to the supervisor on line 52. 
As the RMC model checker expects non-terminating models so as not to report a deadlock, we use 
method endV ( ) in the models.  
4.1.2. Modeling the LTL operator And 
The rebec corresponding to LTL operator ∧ in RV∞–TLG is shown in Figure 7. This rebec also 
first receives the results from both of its children using message servers from_leftChild and 
from_rightChild, and then it behaves as LTL operator ∧ using method and_bhv at line 11 of 
Figure 7.  
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Figure 7 Rebeca model for And worker  
Rebec And uses two state variables leftOp and rightOp for saving the results sent by leftWorker 
and rightWorker, respectively. In addition, these variables are used for specifying the properties 
of the model as well as its verification. 
4.1.3. Modeling the LTL operator Not 
The rebec shown in Figure 8 models the behavior of the worker that acts as LTL operator ¬  in 
RV
∞–TLG. For the sake of brevity, we use the same structure of Child and SMC shown in Figure 
5 for the Not rebec. Therefore, this rebec also has a message server named from_righChild, while 
this message server has no effect on the behavior of this rebec because it only considers the 
result sent by leftWorker saving it in state variable opr at line 10. This state variable is used for 
verifying the model as well. 
After receiving the message from its child, rebec Not processes that using method not_bhv at line 
5. That is, it negates opr and sends it for its Supervisor (i.e. variable parent) on line 6. 
1. reactiveclass And (100) {  
2.     knownrebecs {  Supervisor parent;  SMC mc;  }      
3.     statevars {  
4.          boolean leftOp;     boolean rightOp;      boolean rFlag;  
5.          boolean lFlag;      boolean r_st;      boolean l_st; 
6.     }  
7.     msgsrv initial (  ) { 
8.          leftOp = false;      rightOp = false;       rFlag = false; 
9.          lFlag = false;         r_st = false;        l_st = false; 
10.    }  
11.    msgsrv and_bhv (  ) {  
12.         parent.result_fromOp (leftOp & rightOp, true);  
13.     } 
14.     msgsrv from_leftChild (boolean res, boolean st) { 
15.          leftOp = res;     lFlag = true; l_st = st; 
16.          if (rFlag && l_st && r_st) { 
17.                    lFlag = false;     rFlag = false;      self.and_bhv( ); 
18.         } 
19.         if (rFlag && ((! st) || (! r_st))) { 
20.                   lFlag = false;         rFlag = false;  
21.                  parent.result_fromOp (false, false);   
22.                  mc.sendAP(); 
23.          } 
24.     } 
25.     msgsrv from_rightChild (boolean res, boolean st) { 
26.          rightOp = res;     rFlag = true;     r_st = st; 
27.          if (lFlag && l_st && r_st) { 
28.                    lFlag = false;       rFlag = false;  
29.                    self.and_bhv( ); 
30.          } 
31.          if (lFlag && ((! st) || (! l_st))) { 
32.                    lFlag = false;        rFlag = false;  
33.                    parent.result_fromOp (false, false);   
34.                    mc.sendAP();  
35.          } 
36.     } 
37.     msgsrv endprog( ){ 
38.          if ((!r_st) && (!l_st))  
39.                    parent.result_fromOp (true, true); 
40.          else if (! l_st) 
41.                    parent.result_fromOp (rightOp, true); 
42.          else if (! r_st) 
43.                    parent.result_fromOp (leftOp, true); 
44.          self.endV ( ); 
45.     } 
46.     msgsrv endV ( ) {   self.endV ( );    } 
47. } 
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Figure 8 Rebeca model for Not worker  
4.2. Verification results 
To verify our model, we use model checking; in this section, properties that should be satisfied 
by models are specified in LTL. We have used model checker RMC [32] for verifying our models.
§
  
In terms of LTL operator U, the safety property, which was verified and proved to be true in the 
model, is that when left operand remains true until the right operand becomes true, Supervisor 
should receive a true message from rebec Until, otherwise it should receive a false. In our 
method, as described above, the left operand is the same result sent by leftWorker saved in 
updatedLeftOp, and the right operand is the same result sent by rightWorker saved in 
updatedRightOp. This property is specified in LTL as follows: 
G ( (until.updatedLeftOp U until.updatedRightOp) ∧  parent.resultReceived) →  parent.result) 
G (¬ (until.updatedLeftOp U until.updatedRightOp) ∧  parent.resultReceived) → ¬ parent.result) 
The safety property that rebec And is expected to hold is that Supervisor receives a true from 
rebec And when both of its left operand and right operand are true, otherwise it should receive a 
false. This property was also verified and proved true. In our model, the left operand is the same 
result sent by leftWorker, and the right operand is one sent by rightWorker, which are saved in 
variables leftOp and rightOp, respectively. Therefore, the LTL specification of this property is as 
follows: 
G ( (and.leftOp ∧ and.rightOp) ∧ parent.resultReceived) →  parent.result) 
G ( ¬ (and.leftOp ∧ and.rightOp) ∧ parent.resultReceived) → ¬ parent.result) 
                                                     
§ Rebeca models as well as the output of have been attached to this paper.  
1. reactiveclass Not (100) {  
2.     knownrebecs {   Supervisor parent;  SMC mc;    }      
3.     statevars {    boolean opr;      }  
4.     msgsrv initial ( ) {    opr = false;    }  
5.     msgsrv not_bhv (boolean opr) {  
6.          parent.result_fromOp (!opr, true);  
7.     } 
8.     msgsrv from_leftChild (boolean res, boolean st) { 
9.          if (st) { 
10. opr = res; 
11.              self.not_bhv(opr); 
12.        } 
13.        else { 
14.             parent.result_fromOp (false, false); 
15.             mc.sendAP(); 
16.        } 
17.    } 
18.    msgsrv from_rightChild (boolean resm, boolean st) { 
 // There is no right child! 
 // this message will never be used.  
19.     } 
20.    msgsrv endprog ( ) { 
21.          parent.result_fromOp (false, true); 
22.          self.endV ( ); 
23.     } 
24.    msgsrv endV ( ) {    self.endV ();    } 
25. } 
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For LTL operator ¬, it is expected that Supervisor receives a true from rebec Not if the operand 
of operator ¬ is false. Obviously, in our method, the operand of a not operator is an actor. In the 
models, the value of this operand is the same result sent by leftWorker to rebec Not. The rebec 
saves this value into its state variable opr. Therefore, the LTL property should be held by rebec 
Not is as follows: 
  G ((¬ not.op ∧  parent.resultReceived) → parent.result) 
G ((not.op ∧  parent.resultReceived) → ¬ parent.result) 
Table 2 shows the results of the verification of the forgoing properties by model checker RMC 
[32]. 
Table 2. The verification results 
Property 
RMC Version 2.2 
Status Depth reached Transitions States Time (sec) Memory (MB) 
Until bound reached 10,000 14,621 10,019 0 722.062 
And bound reached 10,000 10,262 9,912 1 3,015.433 
Not bound reached 10,000 10,262 9,912 1 3,014.229 
 
5. An illustrative example 
This section describes a simple example of stateless model checking of an LTL property to 
illustrate the proposed method. This example is a version of the mutual exclusion problem with 
two threads. The pseudo code of the problem is shown in Figure 9 (a). The safety property that 
program should satisfy is that two threads do not enter the critical section at the same time, 
which is specified in LTL as “G (¬ (crit1 ∧ crit2))”; consequently, the APs used by the user in 
the LTL property are crit1 and crit2. In this section, we describe the process of verification of 
this property step by step. It should be pointed out that this property can be verified via the RV
∞–
TLG semantic because its grammar corresponds to the TLG category. 
As we described, the stateless model checker is expected to partition the program code according 
to visible operations. You can see the partitioned code of Figure 9 (a) in Figure 9 (b). Based on 
the rule of partitioning, each of T1 and T2 is divided into six locations. During stateless model 
checking, the model checker schedules threads based on these locations.  
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crit2 := false; 
while (true){ 
      /enter local section/  
              // do something 
       /exit local section/ 
 
      x := 1; 
   
      b2 := true; 
 
      wait ( x = 2 ∨  ¬b1) 
 
 
 
      /critical section/ 
 
       crit2 := true; 
       b2 := 0; 
       crit2 := false 
 
} 
      
      crit1 :=  false; 
      while (true){      
            /enter local section/ 
                    // do something 
            /exit local section/ 
 
             x := 2; 
   
            b1 := true; 
 
            wait ( x = 1 ∨  ¬b2) 
 
        
            /critical section/ 
 
            crit1 := true; 
         
            b1 := 0; 
            crit1 := false 
       } 
(b) 
T2 
 
crit2 := false; 
while (true){ 
      /enter local section/ 
            // do something 
      /exit local section/ 
      x := 1;  
      b2 := true;  
      wait ( x = 2 ∨  ¬b1) 
      /critical section/ 
      crit2 := true; 
      b2 := 0; 
      crit2 := false 
 } 
 
T1 
 
crit1 :=  false; 
while (true){ 
      /enter local section/ 
            // do something 
      /exit local section/ 
      x := 2;  
      b1 := true; 
      wait ( x = 1 ∨  ¬b2) 
      /critical section/ 
      crit1 := true; 
      b1 := 0; 
      crit1 := false; 
} 
// Shared variables:  
b1 := false;  b2 := false; x := 1; 
(a) 
Figure 9 An example of the mutual exclusion problem 
At the end of each location (i.e. after a thread yields the CPU due to reaching the end of its 
current location), the model checker informs condition checkers about the current status of their 
AP. Hereafter, we suppose that stateless model checker has partitioned the program (i.e. Figure 9 
(b)) and is ready to start model checking.  
Now, let us start explaining the verification process for this example. First of all, the master actor 
loads the defined property. Here, the user has defined only one property so master only creates 
one property checker, which is responsible for verifying the specified property. Now, property 
checker should create the hierarchy of workers. Frist, it standardizes the specified property as 
follows: 
G (¬ (crit1 ∧ crit2)) = ¬F ¬ (¬ (crit1 ∧ crit2)) = ¬ (true U (crit1 ∧ crit2)) 
Next, property checker should parse this property and initiates creation of the hierarchy of 
workers. The parse tree for this property is shown in Figure 10. After parsing, property checker 
creates a worker that behaves as a not operator, and sends the sub-tree of the not operator to this 
worker. This worker also parses the received sub-tree, creates an until worker, and sends the sub-
tree under operator until to the created worker. The until worker also parses its sub-trees and 
creates a condition checker as its right child, which only generates true. For its left child, the 
 
1 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
3
4 
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until worker creates an and worker sending the reminder of the tree to this worker. After parsing 
the received sub-tree, the and worker creates two condition checkers that check APs crit1 and 
crit2. 
After creating the hierarchy, the model checker starts to explore the state space and verification. 
Suppose the model checker first schedules T2; therefore, T2 performs its computation from the 
beginning of location 1 to the end of this location. At the end of this location, T2 is preempted, 
and the stateless model checker sends the status of APs to the condition checkers. At this time, 
both of crit1 and crit2 are false, hence “condition checkers 2” and “condition checkers 3” send 
false to the “worker 3” (see Figure 10). As “worker 3” is an and operator, it generates false 
because both of its operands are false. Therefore, “worker 2” receives a false message from its 
right worker and receives a true from its left worker. 
According to the behavior of an until worker (Figure 6), the “worker 2” still waits for hearing 
from its children in the next status.  For the sake of brevity, we summarize this process in Table 
3.  As you can see in Table 3, the model checker schedules threads as follows: “s1: T2, s2: T2, s3: 
T1, s4: T1, s5: T1, s6: T1, s7: T1, s8: T2, s9: T2, s10: T2”. The described situation recurs until s7.   
We go on explaining with s7, where T1 enters the critical section and crit1 becomes true. As a 
result, at the end of this state, “condition checker 2” receives a true message and “condition 
checker 3” receives a false. Consequently, “worker 3” generates a false message so the reminder 
of the process is similar to what was described above. This situation recurs until the end of s9, 
where T2 also enters the critical section causing crit2 to become true. 
 
Figure 10  The parse tree of property ¬ (true U (crit1 ∧ crit2)) 
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At the end of s10, the model checker sends true to both “condition checker 2” and “condition 
checker 3”, whereby “worker 3” also concludes a true result, and sends it to “worker 2”. 
Therefore, “worker 2” receives true from both left worker and right worker so it also sends a true 
message to “worker 1”. As “worker 1” is a not operator, it negates the received result. 
Consequently, “worker 1” evaluates the result of verification as false. This result is sent to 
property checker. When property checker receives a (false, true) message, it concludes that a 
violation has occurred. 
To briefly explain this example without complexity, we considered a non-terminating program. 
But, suppose that loop “while (true)” does not exist. Therefore, the program eventually comes to 
an end. In this case, the stateless model checker generates possible finite executions of the 
program. Suppose it generates different executions as follows: 
00,s
i : T1, T1, T2, T1, T1, T2, T2, T2, T1, T1, T2, T2, T2. 
01,s
i : T1, T2, T2, T1, T2, T1, T1, T2, T2, T2, T1, T1, T1. 
… 
0,k s
i : T2, T2, T1, T1, T1, T1, T1, T2, T2, T2. 
As a result, the property is independently checked in each iteration. If the property is satisfied in 
all iterations, then the program satisfies the property. Obviously, if the property is violated in (at 
least) one iteration, for example in 
0,k s
i , it means that the program does not satisfy the property. 
6. Implementation issues 
All actors of the verification hierarchy act in parallel with the stateless model checker. This 
hierarchy is very quickly formed at the beginning of stateless model checking. We are going to 
implement our method by Erlang programming language [31], in which processes (i.e. actors) 
are very lightweight and cheap to create (about 100 times lighter than threads) [53]. Message 
passing in Erlang is also very fast (about one micro second) [30, 53]. Therefore, there is no 
concern about the process creation and message-passing overhead. Erlang provides the best 
implementation of the Actor model [28], whereby we can precisely implement the proposed 
method. 
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Table 3. The verification process for the example shown in Figure 9 
 s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 
The scheduled thread - T2 T2 T1 T1 T1 T1 T1 T2 T2 T2 
Location number T1 points 
to 
1 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Location number T2 points 
to 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 
x1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
b1 false false false false true true true true true true true 
b2 false false false false false false false false true true true 
crit1 false false false false false false false true true true true 
crit2 false false false false false false false false false false true 
Message received by 
“condition checker 2” 
- 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
true, 
true 
true, 
true 
true, 
true 
true, 
true 
Message received by 
“condition checker 3” 
- 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
true, 
true 
Message sent by “worker 3” - 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
false, 
true 
true, 
true 
Message sent by “worker 2” - 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
true, 
true 
Message sent by “worker 1” - 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
false 
false, 
true 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper proposes a new verification method for stateless model checking of LTL properties. 
In our method verifies formulae dynamically without storing any program states. The proposed 
method is designed based on the Actor model. Thanks to this model, we can create cheap and 
lightweight actors that check LTL properties simultaneously with stateless state space 
exploration.  
The method proposed in this paper is designed as the unit of LTL checking for DSCMC [27, 35], 
which is a parallel stateless code model checker. We are implementing this method in DSCMC. 
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This tool needs to analyze and instrument program code before performing stateless model 
checking. Currently, code is manually instrumented in DSCMC. Therefore, in the future, code 
instrumentation must be automated for using DSCMC in large programs. Once this has been done, 
we will be able to utilize the proposed method for real-world programs. 
As for stateless model checking, it may be impractical to precisely handle non-deterministic user 
input. Then in practice, using the method to verify large programs may be transformed to 
systematically testing, but it is still powerful enough to explore the state space of large programs 
whose state space exploration is impractical using state-based methods [1, 4, 25, 26, 37, 54]. 
However, to cover more execution paths, the method can be improved by employing test 
generation techniques, such as white-box fuzz testing  [55, 56] and symbolic execution [57]. 
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